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Abstract:
The paper analyses the payment behaviour of customers of the online music label 
Magnatune. Customers may pay what they want for albums, as long as the 
payment is within a given price range ($5-$18). Magnatune’s comprehensive pre-
purchase access facilitates music discovery and allows an informed buying 
decision setting it apart from conventional online music stores.
On average customers pay $8.20, far more than the minimum of $5 and even 
higher than the recommended price of $8. We analyse the relationship between 
artists/labels and customers in online music. We consider social preferences, in 
particular concerns for reciprocity. The resulting sequential reciprocity equilibrium 
corresponds to the observed pattern of behaviour.
We conclude that Magnatune’s open contracts design can encourage people to 
make voluntary payments and may be a viable business option.
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Do Consumers Pay Voluntarily?
The Case of Online Music
Abstract:
The paper analyses the payment behaviour of customers of the online music 
label Magnatune. Customers may pay what they want for albums, as long as 
the payment is within a given price range ($5-$18). Magnatune’s 
comprehensive pre-purchase access facilitates music discovery and allows 
an informed buying decision setting it apart from conventional online music 
stores.
On average customers pay $8.20, far more than the minimum of $5 and 
even higher than the recommended price of $8. We analyse the relationship 
between artists/labels and customers in online music. We consider social 
preferences, in particular concerns for reciprocity. The resulting sequential 
reciprocity equilibrium corresponds to the observed pattern of behaviour.
We conclude that Magnatune’s open contracts design can encourage people 
to make voluntary payments and may be a viable business option.
1. Introduction
This paper covers and combines two areas of high recent interest: Socially-
minded behaviour and the transforming digital media industry. 
Social preferences of individuals have been increasingly studied in 
theoretical and empirical research.1 Our paper checks the external validity of 
the results from numerous laboratory experiments. While voluntary 
payments can be observed frequently in lab environments, we test these 
findings in a real-life context using data from an online music store. 
The music business is of particular interest as this industry struggles to 
adjust its conventional business model to the challenges of online peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing networks. Conventional online music stores attempt 
to implement Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems in order to stop 
illicit copying. However, effective copy protection appears to be impossible to 
achieve as P2P file sharing still thrives. Moreover, the common DRM 
systems restrict customers in their consumption in various ways.2 The label 
                                                
1 See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for surveys of the literature in behavioural 
economics.
2 The usage of P2P networks has not decreased despite numerous legal and technological 
activities of the music industry. Commonly, DRM restricts music discovery with no or very limited 
sample possibilities and restricts music listening with a limited number of permitted CD burns 
and transfers to mobile devices. Moreover, file formats may be incompatible with player 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
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and online store Magnatune (www.magnatune.com) goes another way. It 
lets customers choose from a given price range ($5 to $18 for an album). 
Hence, customers can essentially pay what they want for music. Magnatune
also allows comprehensive pre-purchase access to its songs so that 
potential customers can discover the music they really like. 
The aim of the paper is to find out how much customers paid on average, 
what made them pay more than the bare minimum and whether the concept 
of such an open contract design can work in the market place. Therefore, we 
collected a data set of all the label’s transactions over 18 months in order to 
analyse the payments that customers made.
The empirical analysis shows that the average payment per album is not 
only significantly higher than the minimum price ($5), but it is also higher 
than the recommended price of $8 suggested on the web site. We relate 
these findings to the theoretical background of information goods markets 
and take social preferences into account. The observed pattern of behaviour 
can be explained with concerns for reciprocity using the psychological game 
theory framework of Geanakoplos et al. (1989).
We study the Principal-Agent relationship between artists/labels and 
customers. The moral hazard aspect is inspired by the literature that started 
with Fehr et al. (1997). The benefits of contracts that give a mutual 
opportunity to reciprocate are described in a labour market setting where 
worker’s effort is not contractible. We transform this approach to the context 
of information goods markets where payment becomes non-contractible due 
to widespread file sharing. Moreover, the importance of sampling 
opportunities for experience goods such as music is taken into account. 
Magnatune offers a free and comprehensive music discovery tool and this 
pre-purchase access to the album allows customers to make an informed 
buying decision. When customers have full pre-purchase access to songs 
they are interested in, they can experience the information good long 
enough to determine how much it is worth to them and decide whether they 
really want to buy it.
We focus on an intentions-based approach of social preferences that 
incorporates reciprocity into the utility function as pioneered by Rabin (1993).
The resulting sequential reciprocity equilibrium following Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) explains the voluntary payments found in the data. In 
addition to the frequent occurrence of voluntary payments in the data set our 
analysis also confirms that these payments are not randomly distributed. We 
observe type-dependant patterns among frequent customers, possibly 
caused by customer-specific underlying motivations for social preferences.
These results complement the experimental literature on social preferences 
by validating their findings outside of the lab. While the contribution 
behaviour of individuals has been studied in the field (see List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002) or Frey and Meier (2004)), to the best of our knowledge this 
                                                                                                                                              
software.  Generally, established consumption patterns for music are not well taken into 
account.
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paper is the first field study of voluntary payments in a commercial online 
environment.
The following section describes the music label Magnatune in detail. Section 
3 describes our data set, while Section 4 analyses it. Section 5 relates the 
findings to the theoretical background. The conclusions are in Section 6.
2. The Music Label and Online Store Magnatune 
The label was founded in October 2003 and it has around 200 artists on 
contract. Magnatune prides itself of having a very strict selection process to 
guarantee high quality. The revenue is evenly split between artist and 
Magnatune. Music albums are sold via the label’s online store where no 
DRM system is implemented. Files are not protected and quality and format 
is up to the customer. Even CD-quality files can be downloaded and the 
formats on offer give a good choice: WAV, MP3, OGG, FLAC and AAC. The 
payment is variable as customers can set the price themselves. The price 
range for an artist’s album is $5 to $18 and Magnatune recommends $8. The 
actual price is selected by the customer in a pop-up menu where $8 is the 
default setting. 
Payment is processed by credit card or PayPal. It is not compulsory to leave 
an e-mail, customers can remain anonymous at Magnatune. Albums can be 
downloaded online or bought as a CD. A fee ($4.97) for the physical costs of 
material and shipping is due for CD purchases. Magnatune is based in the 
USA, but as an online store it has customers around the world.
Magnatune’s artists are categorised in various genres. There is a wide range 
of music available from classical music to Electronica, Jazz and Blues, 
Metal&Punk, New Age, Rock and Pop, World and several more. Magnatune 
can be seen as a niche label that offers music of relatively unknown artists. 
Mainstream music of famous artists is not sold. Therefore, the focus of 
Magnatune – and the paper’s – is music of less-known artists and 
subsequently uncertain quality. 
This makes experience goods aspects even more important and they are 
well taken into account at Magnatune as music discovery is greatly 
facilitated. Full streaming access to all songs is provided in low or high 
quality. An online radio service lets customers try out songs conveniently. It 
can be used to listen to genre selections or artists’ albums. Visitors of the 
site are allowed to test every song as often as they want. Essentially, 
consumers have all possible means available to sample music and find out 
how much an album is worth to them before having to make a decision 
about the payment. This stands in stark contrast to the usual practice of 
conventional online music stores where merely 30 seconds snippets of 
songs are available for sampling if at all. Magnatune’s comprehensive pre-
purchase access allows customers to make an informed buying decision.
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3. Description of the Data Set
Our data set goes back to the actual start of Magnatune’s service in 
September 2003 and contains all 14,367 album purchases from then until 
January 2005. Apart from the payment we also collected the purchase date, 
an encrypted identifier of the customer, the gender and country of residence, 
the artist, the music genre, the means of payment, the type (download or 
CD) and whether an e-mail address was left or not. In addition to these 
variables we computed the time difference between purchases, the total 
amount of purchases and the number of a respective purchase of a 
customer. Moreover, we created a dummy variable for female customers, if 
no email was left, if a CD was purchased, if PayPal was used and also 
various country and genre dummies.3
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable obs mean median st.dev. min max
Payment [$] 14,367 8.197 8 2.301 5 24
Total customers 7,620 1.86 1 2.657 1 49
time difference [days] 6,747 31.03 2 62.32 0 429
“female” dummy 10,718 0.087 0 0.282 0 1
“no e-mail” dummy 14,367 0.044 0 0.206 0 1
“CD” dummy 14,367 0.039 0 0.195 0 1
“PayPal” dummy 14,367 0.297 0 0.457 0 1
The average payment for an album is $8.197, the median and mode of the 
distribution are both $8. The minimum payment made is the lower limit of the 
price range: $5. Customers were allowed to pay in Euros and in British 
pounds, too. The same price range (5-18) was applied to these currencies, 
while our data set contains the (converted) dollar amounts. This is the 
reason why the maximum payment in the data set exceeds the actual upper 
limit of the price range. The different exchange rates have been taken into 
account in December 2004 as the price ranges for payments in Euros and 
pounds have been modified (in the meantime they are 4€ to 14€ with 6€ 
recommended and £3 to £10 with £4 recommended).
The data has been generated by 7,620 different customers; most of them 
(4,986) purchased only one album. On average customers bought 1.86 
albums. The most albums a customer purchased are 49. The time difference 
shows the time (expressed in days) between purchases. It is only generated 
with more than one purchase available. The following rows describe the 
dummy variables “female”, “no email”, “CD” and “PayPal”. 8.7% of the 
customers with gender data have been female.4 Only 4.4% of customers 
                                                
3 Information about customers’ gender and their country of residence could not be collected for 
the entire data set. 
4 The association of a gender to the purchase was based on the name of the customer. This 
produced unambiguous results for approximately 75% of the observations. The remaining 
purchases could not be identified in terms of gender.
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have chosen not to leave their e-mail. The purchase of proper CDs has been 
introduced in October 2004 which explains the low percentage of CDs 
bought (3.9%). They have been quite popular though despite the additional 
cost for shipping and packaging. PayPal has been used for 29.7% of 
purchases, while almost all of the other purchases have been handled via 
credit card.
Table 2 shows the payment data for countries where Magnatune albums 
have been bought.5 The majority of purchases come from the USA 
(approximately 73% of sales). The list includes the main markets (USA, UK, 
Canada, EU), but also countries from other geographical areas given there 
is a reasonable amount of data available. GDP per capita numbers are 
added from the World Bank Statistics, 2004.
TABLE 2: COUNTRY DATA
Country obs. mean median st.dev. min max GDP/capita
Canada 371 8.08 8 1.82 5 18 29,866
Germany 190 8.21 8 2.38 5 22.03 32,930
France 163 8.52 8 2.09 5 18 33,015
Israel 8 6.75 5 1.98 5 10 18,727
Italy 65 8.67 8 3.85 5 22.03 28,782
Japan 110 7.74 8 2.23 5 16 36,286
Mexico 30 5.90 5 1.42 5 10 6,370
Singapore 13 7.46 8 1.51 5 10 24,134
Spain 55 7.67 8 1.49 5 12.24 24,577
Switzerland 81 9.28 8 2.98 5 18 47,999
UK 366 8.65 8 2.36 5 24 35,421
USA 3,838 8.18 8 2.14 5 18 39,453
Finally, a number of different genres are offered at Magnatune. The music is 
grouped into the genres Classical, Electronica, Jazz and Blues, Metal&Punk, 
New Age, Rock and Pop, World and Others. Classical music is the most 
popular genre with over 4,000 purchases. World, Electronica, Rock and Pop 
and New Age follow with around 2,000 purchases each.
The variation in purchases has been fairly stable over time. Table 3 shows 
the payment data for the quarters that are available in full. There were 472 
transactions before the 4th quarter of 2003 and 747 after the 4th quarter of 
2004.
TABLE 3: PAYMENTS OVER TIME
Period 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q3 2004 Q4
Observations 2283 3208 2703 2306 2648
Mean 8.16 8.19 8.13 8.17 8.17
Standard deviation 2.21 2.20 2.18 2.17 2.21
                                                
5 Country information has been collected in the period of 09-12/2004.
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4. Analysis of the Data Set
4.1.Regression
The payment is the dependent variable in our regression and the equation 
we estimate is
 Xbkp
where k is the constant, b is the vector of the coefficients, X is the vector 
of our variables and  is the error term. The explanatory variables are the 
index of a purchase, the total purchases of the respective customer, the time 
difference and the dummies for female, no email, PayPal, CD customers, for 
the countries and genres. 
The given price range restricts the payment of customers. Therefore, the 
distribution of the payment is left-censored at $5 and right-censored at $24.  
A censored regression model appears appropriate for our data. The Tobit 
model takes limits of the range of the dependent variable into account, to 
ensure unbiased and consistent estimates. Table 4 lists the variables, their 
coefficients and respective standard errors for our Tobit maximum likelihood 
estimations. These are the results of the standard Tobit model, which 
assumes a single distribution function for the dependent variable. This 
approach seems plausible since the decision on whether to make a 
voluntary payment or not and the decision how much to pay in excess of the 
minimum (given one has chosen to make a voluntary payment) are not 
clearly separated ones. A two-equation model of Cragg (1971) would be an 
alternative to take the separate decisions into account. (Amemiya 1984) 
We ran two regressions: One with the full data set of 14,367 observations
using a random effects model controlling for artist heterogeneity, one with
repeated purchases only (observations where the customer made a 
purchase before) using a random effects model controlling for customer 
heterogeneity. Repeated customers are recognised by their email identifier. 
This is why the variable “No e-mail” is excluded from regression 2.
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TABLE 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Regression 1 (all observations) Regression 2 (repeated purchases)
Explanatory variable Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Index of purchase -.0655 *** .0196 .0151 .0139
Index squared .0006 .0005 -.0005 .0003
Total purchases -.0338 ** .0132 -.0049 .0127
Total squared .0017 *** .0003 .0003 .0003
Previous payment -- -- .0075 *** .0001
Time difference -- -- .0016 *** .0003  
Genre Ambient -.2509 * .1478 -.3410 *** .1207
Electronica .1913 * .1176 .0193 .0949
Rock .2777 ** .1219     .1122 .0964 
New Age .0896 .1217 .0391 .0980
Classical .1615 * .0988 .0106 .0832
World .1151 .1138 -.0149 .0930
Jazz -.0781 .1689 .1752 .1412
Relaxing .1132 .4025 -.0192 .2544
Blues .2087 .3618 .3365 .2707
Metal -.0238 .1711 -.2335 .1460
Opera -.8665 ** .4906 -.8088 ** .3832
Christian .2847 .3151 .2153 .2828
No e-mail -1.004 *** .1154 -- --
PayPal -.2070 *** .0525 -.0102 .0528
CD .9027 *** .1168 .2069 .1304
Female .0860 .0872 -.1310 .0903
UK .5554 *** .1460 .1164 .1502
Japan -.5696 ** .2646 -.6469 ** .2688
Germany .1906 .2007 .0491 . 2011 
Switzerland 1.165 *** .3025 .2534 .3152
Canada .0073 .1436 .0713 .1438 
France .4220 ** .2185 .440 ** .2540 
Mexico -3.285 *** .5825 -2.785 *** .8589
Italy .2302 .3407 .0463 . 3656 
Spain -.3377 .3890 .1271 .3748
Singapore -.2285 .7432 .2211 1.019
Israel -2.249 ** .9716 -2.761 ** 1.227
Constant 8.168 *** .0984 1.653 *** .1362
                              Number of observations: 14,367          Number of observations: 6,747
                              Log likelihood = -28729.26                Log likelihood = -11797.501                  
                           2,081  left-censored,                                    1,083  left-censored 
                           18 right-censored observations,                12 right-censored observations
Random-effects Tobit regressions, statistical significance (*=10%/**=5%/***=1%)
The index of a purchase is statistically significant at the 1%-level and it 
affects the payment negatively. It seems that initial payments are rather 
high, while later payments of frequent customers are lower. The total 
number of purchases of a customer is also significant as well as the squared 
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term. This appears to hint at a quadratic relationship between the payment 
and the total purchases made.
In addition, the regression shows that customers who prefer to remain 
anonymous tend to pay less. When no e-mail is left, the payment is 
significantly lower. This fits into the psychological picture of free riders. The 
payment type (PayPal or credit card) did not have an impact on payments
(when customer heterogeneity is considered). On the other hand, customers 
buying CDs paid significantly more. They might appreciate getting a CD with 
cover art more than the postage and package premium they have to pay 
when they order a CD. The dummy for female customers is not significant.
Some of the genre dummies are significant among the 12 we have analysed. 
The genre ‘Opera’ had a negative impact on the payment. The genre ‘Rock’ 
had the most significant positive impact (5%-level). The country dummies 
show that payment is affected by where customers live. The effect of 
purchases from Switzerland and UK is significant and positive. The effect of 
purchases from Mexico and Israel is significant and negative. The time 
difference between purchases is positive and significant in the second 
regression. As the time difference for albums bought on the same day is 
zero, this may indicate that customers might apply an imaginary bulk 
discount, since they have the choice of how much to pay for albums.
The censored regression model is based on maximum likelihood and it 
assumes a normal distribution of the error term and homoscedasticity. A 
Bera-Jarque test confirmed the normality assumption. Our estimation results 
give some indication about what affects the voluntary payment for music. 
Naturally, the biggest explanatory factor for the payment is the actual value 
of the music to the respective customer which is not measurable. 
Understandably, the fit of the regression is not particularly good with 4%. 
However, our data analysis shows that Magnatune customers on average 
pay even more than what is actually recommended. Only 2,081 of all 14,367 
purchases (14.5%) were at the required minimum of $5, the majority of 
purchases (7,967 or 55.4%) were paid with the recommended $8 and the 
average of all purchases is at $8.20. 
4.2. Impact of Country GDPs on Payments
We have seen that several country dummies were significant. However, the
variation in the voluntary payments with respect to the country of residence 
has to be taken with caution. It can be explained by different underlying 
wealth levels. The different GDP per capita numbers seem to cause the 
variation and rather not cultural or regional differences. Figure 1 plots the 
payment means and the GDP per capita of the analysed countries (see 
Table 2 for the respective numbers).
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Figure 1: Country payment means vs. GDP per capita
There appears to be a linear relationship between average voluntary 
payments in a country and its GDP per capita. The disposable income 
affects the willingness to pay which is only reasonable. Likewise, the CD 
price people are accustomed to in their local market (CDs cost less in, say, 
Mexico than in the USA) may influence their decision of how much to pay.
4.3. Impact of Framing Effects due to the Price Range Conversion
Currency conversions are another potential cause for a bias in the countries’ 
payment means. The fact that the price range was directly transformed into 
Euros and pounds might have led Europeans to spend more. While $8 are 
recommended to customers paying in dollar, £8/8€ were suggested to 
customers paying in pounds/Euro. The exchange rate during the observation 
period was approximately 1.75 USD/GBP and 1.25 USD/EUR. Thus, a price 
range of approximat ly $8.75 minimum, $14 recommended and $31.5 
maximum price was perceived by customers paying in pounds and 
$6.25/$10/$22.5 by customers paying in Euro. Hence, framing effects might 
have occurred. 
Price ranges were adjusted in 12/2004 to accommodate for the exchange 
rates. £3 minimum, £4 recommended and £10 maximum (4€/6€/14€) have
been used since then. In 2004 this translated into $5.25, $7 and $17.5 for 
payments in pounds and $5, $7.5 and $17.5 for payments in Euro – slightly 
less than the original dollar values ($5, $8, $18). Furthermore, making the 
payment in Euro or pounds was only an option. European customer could 
also simply pay in dollar and this option appeared more conveniently in the 
selection menu. Thus, we can group the European payment data by the 
period (before and after the conversion adjustment in 12/2004) and the 
currency used for the payment (dollars or pounds/Euro). 
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We focus on the three European countries with the most observations (UK, 
Germany and France) in order to analyse the effects induced by the 
suggested price range. Table 5 shows the data before and after the 
adjustment, separated by the countries and whether the payment was made 
in $ or the local currency. 
TABLE 5: IMPACT OF PRICE RANGE CONVERSION
UK Germany France
Payment obs mean obs mean obs mean
in $ before 239 8.19 117 7.89 83 8.48
after 77 8.13 38 7.34** 34 7.76* 
in local currency before 28 12.68 19 11.27 20 10.28
after 22 10.33** 16 9.02*** 20 8.20***
Total 366 8.65 190 8.21 157 8.52
Level of statistical significance (*=10%/**=5%/***=1%) of the payments’ mean after being 
different from the mean before in a Mann-Whitney test.
We ran Mann-Whitney tests to see whether there was a significant effect on 
the payment behaviour caused by the price range adjustment. We compared 
the payments before and after the correction took place in 12/2004. When 
customers paid in local currency, the payments dropped significantly for all 
countries. In contrast, only payments from German customers dropped as 
well at a significant level, when we consider the “control group” of payments 
made in $. An increase in sales can be noticed when comparing the two 
months before the change (10+11/2004) to the two months after (12/2004 
and 01/2005): from 14 to 22 transactions in UK, from 12 to 16 transactions in 
Germany and from 19 to 20 transactions in France. 
The suggestions of the web site appear to have a significant effect on the 
payment decision of customers. A reduction of minimum, recommended and 
maximum price leads to a significant decrease in average payments. It 
seems that the voluntary payments are very sensitive to such framing. The 
drop in average payments is however offset by the increase in volume.
4.4.Payment Patterns of Frequent Customers
Another interesting aspect of the collected observations is how the voluntary 
payments are distributed. Do they occur in rather random fashion within the
transactions of specific customers or do they mainly differ across 
customers?
We therefore clustered the observed transactions based on the previous 
payment made into the groups minimum, default, high (>$12) payment. With 
$5 as previous payment, average payment was $5.49, with a previous 
payment of $8, the average payment was $8.01 and with more than $12 as 
previous payment, average payment was $12.29. Moreover, the previous 
payment explained the current payment with high significance in the 
regression of repeated purchases. 
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In order to get an even better understanding about the tendency of 
customers to make a decision based upon a consistent underlying 
motivation or not, we analysed the payment patterns of 36 customers who 
had more than 15 transactions. Four different groups can be easily 
distinguished. These are customers who essentially paid the minimum of $5, 
the default of $8, customers who paid significantly more than the default (on 
average) and the ones who paid less over time (decreasing time trend). The 
diagrams of Figure 1 show representative customers for each group. 20 
customers paid the default of $8 (nine always $8, eleven with minor 
deviations like id6252 in Figure 2), four paid mostly the minimum (one 
always $5), six paid more than the default and four exhibited a decreasing 
pattern.6 It appears that customers’ paying behaviour is indeed driven by 
underlying motivations that are specific to individuals. 
Figure 2: Representative Customers for Each Identified Group
5. Theoretical Background
The online music industry mainly consists of labels, intermediary online 
stores and artists on one side and customers on the other. Artists create 
                                                
6 The transaction prices of only two frequent customers did not fit any of the four categories. The 
payment patterns of all 36 analysed customers are available upon request.
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music, which is purchased by customers via the label’s (or an intermediary’s) 
web site.7 In the sector of relatively unknown artists Magnatune can be seen 
as an alternative to the conventional music business model. In this specific 
market labels have the choice between the conventional approach (limited 
access beforehand and a fixed price) and the Magnatune concept. 
Two aspects of information goods markets play an important role in this 
context. Potential consumers of information goods (like online music) are 
increasingly difficult to exclude from consumption due to the widespread 
availability of files in P2P networks. Information goods are also experience 
goods and their actual value might be unclear to customers prior to the 
purchase. We consider these aspects in order to analyse the strategic 
decisions labels/artists face in this market. Our analysis takes social 
preferences into account8 and relates to the empirical results.
5.1. Information Goods Markets
Payment moral hazard describes the uncertainty of principals with respect to 
the payment of agents in information goods markets. The relationship 
between principal (label or artist) and agent (customers) is about the agent 
making a payment in exchange for the consumption of music. While this 
contractual relationship is very trivial to enforce for physical goods (CDs) of 
the traditional music industry, it is far from that for "weightless" music 
(downloads). P2P networks make files non-excludable, e.g. they could be 
consumed without paying for them. The principal – artists and labels – does 
not know whether consumed goods have been paid for by agents or at least 
they cannot enforce payment. This information asymmetry causes non-
contractibility of the payment. Fehr et al. (1997) point out the benefits of 
mutual opportunities to reciprocate in moral hazard environments, when they 
analyse a simple labour market with firms, workers and excess supply of 
workers.9 Our approach is similar, albeit adjusted to the described payment 
moral hazard in information goods markets.
                                                
7 The interests and characteristics of artists and their labels are usually not too aligned in the 
music industry and artists and labels should therefore not be treated as one entity. However, 
Magnatune is certainly an exception to that. Its slogan is: “We're a record label. But we're not 
evil.” (www.magnatune.com). It shares revenues equally with the artists. A direct connection 
between the payment of the customer and the income of the artist can be seen. We therefore do 
not distinguish between artists and the label.
8 Besides social preferences, reputation concerns are another possible theoretical explanation 
for generous payments in repeated interaction.
However, music customers generally know that they do not enter a specific relationship with the 
artist when they decide to purchase an album. The artist might appreciate the voluntary 
payment of a customer and the customer might even be identifiable by the email address, but 
still the next album will be produced for the general audience and not for a specific customer. 
This is important, because it excludes strategic considerations like reputation as the motivation 
for voluntary payments.
9 Three different contracts are simulated in experiments. While contract terms were exogenously 
enforced in the first treatment, workers were able to reciprocate in the second and both firms 
and workers were able to reciprocate in the third treatment. Effort levels of workers were 
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Information goods are experience goods since customers do not know what 
they are worth to them until they experience them often enough. Hence, their 
exact value to the customer is quite unknown ex ante and the valuation 
rather develops until the good has been experienced often enough and the 
true worth has been established. While there is always uncertainty regarding 
the ex post utility of an information good in a conventional sale10, as 
described Magnatune customers are much better aware of the ex post utility 
of music they buy. Without such a chance to experience the information 
good, customers risk ending up with a disappointing purchase.  Buyer’s 
remorse can result and this uncertainty reduces the willingness to pay of 
customers who consider a purchase based only on the sample or description 
of the music. This disappointment can be avoided, when customers have full 
pre-purchase access to songs they are interested in. They can experience 
the information good long enough to determine how much it is worth to them 
and decide whether they really want to buy it. 
5.2.Online Music
In the standard approach of contract theory the principal implements 
second-best contracts based on incentive compatibility and a participation 
constraint.11 The set up of Magnatune represents an alternative contract 
design. The offered contract is rather incomplete due to the variable pricing 
scheme and the agent has the opportunity to respond to the action of the 
principal. 
The strategic interaction between label/artists (M) and customers (C) is 
sequential. First, M decides whether to allow free comprehensive pre-
purchase access to the music or not. Then, the customers make their 
purchase and payment decision. Their value from consumption is v and M 
receives the payment p .
We distinguish between two levels of pre-purchase access to music. Very 
limited possibilities to sample songs as it is common in conventional online 
music stores restricts the music discovery of customers. Instead, 
comprehensive pre-purchase access (as provided by Magnatune) allows 
sufficient sampling and customers are well-informed about music before they 
have to make a purchase decision. According to recent survey results 
(INDICARE 2005) streaming access to songs is not a substitute for buying 
them as customers prefer to own music. Moreover, songs are real 
experience goods. Artists are not famous enough and they have not built up 
                                                                                                                                              
significantly higher in the last treatment and a contract that gives the opportunity for mutual 
reciprocity was found to improve efficiency.
10 It can be reduced by short samples or recommendations, for instance, but never completely 
avoided. 
11 In the information goods context of the music industry this could be a high fixed price 
enforced by strong copy protection and law.
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a reputation so that customers know their music already, which would make 
the sampling less important. 
The value of an album’s consumption depends therefore on the extent of 
pre-purchase access. When customers have full access and can sample 
songs on offer easily, they are able to pick the albums they really enjoy. 
They know their value from consumption is the full ex post value of music v . 
Limited access leaves them with uncertainty about the ex post value. They 
might not find the albums they will actually enjoy most or they possibly 
choose music that turns out to be disappointing. Knowing this, their 
purchase decision is based on the expected value v which is less than the 
full ex post value v . 
The payment for an album depends on the chosen access (limited or full) 
and whether the customer decides to be kind or nasty. Given full pre-
purchase access the nasty choice of the customer would be to just pay the 
minimum price minp required for the purchase, while the kind choice is a 
voluntary payment of volp which is necessarily below the actual value v of 
the album. When pre-purchase access is limited, the kind choice of 
customers would be to simply pay the default price of the store, which is p . 
The nasty choice of customers is to try obtaining the file on P2P networks for 
free. A fraction of customers ( of the whole population) will succeed in this 
and they do not pay for consumption. Only the remaining fraction 1 pay 
the store and the price that applies to customers making the nasty choice is 
the price under DRM taking leakage to the P2P networks into account: 
ppDRM  )1(  .
The fraction of file sharers  is defined to be 0   1. Their access to P2P 
networks gives them less efficient sampling possibilities than at M and their 
valuation is also the expected value v .
5.3.The “Magnatune” Game
The structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 3. The following numerical 
example illustrates the payoffs of the game. It builds on the actual prices of 
Magnatune. The minimum price to be paid under full access is $5, the fixed 
price in online stores is $8 and the kind voluntary payment under full access 
is $10. The value of listening is $15. When the customer is uncertain about 
the value due to the limited pre-purchase access the value is only $8. The 
‘leakage’ in a DRM environment is $2.12 This represents the part of 
customers that turns to P2P file sharing. Store revenues ($8) are reduced by 
this.
                                                
12 If piracy is ubiquitous and unstoppable, then the revenue under DRM is zero and M prefers 
“full access”. A moderate amount of piracy and thus leakage is more reasonable.
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Figure 3: The “Magnatune” Game
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game is (limited access, (nasty, 
nasty)). M would not be willing to offer full access knowing that C will prefer 
the higher payoff of playing nasty (paying the minimum only). Instead, M 
offers limited access and C plays nasty (using P2P copies if possible). This 
would mean labels operate with fixed prices exclusively and some piracy 
occurs.
However, this solution is not in line with the collected data. The observed 
pattern of behaviour corresponds more to an outcome of (full access, kind). 
Moving away from strictly selfish individuals and introducing social 
preferences helps in order to explain what we see in the data. Social 
preferences do not give up the assumption that individuals maximise their 
utility. They merely allow utility to reflect social concerns as well. Besides 
individuals’ own payoffs it matters to them as well what the payoffs and 
intentions of other individuals are. A few theoretical approaches exist and 
they are surveyed in Fehr and Schmidt (2003) as well as Camerer (2003). 
We focus on concerns for reciprocity to explain the observed behaviour of 
Magnatune customers. The provision of comprehensive pre-purchase 
access can be regarded as kind behaviour by customers as it allows them to 
make a more informed purchase choice. Hence, if customers have social 
preferences, they are willing to return this kind treatment. In contrast, selfish 
customers would free ride. The open contract design – customers are free to 
choose the payment from a given range – provides opportunities to 
reciprocate by making a high voluntary payment. Fairness and reciprocity 
can also be regarded as the enforcement device of this contract design.
C
M
Full access
Limited 
access
kind kindnasty nasty
M: 10    5         8         6
C: 5   10         0           2
C
Page 17 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
16
We apply social preferences to the “Magnatune” game based on 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). A sequential reciprocity equilibrium13 of 
(full access, (kind, nasty)) results when (sufficient) players have a tendency 
to reciprocate. The known equilibrium of (limited access, (nasty, nasty)) 
results when individuals are insufficiently motivated by reciprocity, e.g. are 
selfish.
5.4.Sequential Reciprocity Theory
This section outlines how the sequential reciprocity equilibrium of the game 
is determined based on the seminal work of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger (2004). The utility function of socially minded individuals 
increases not only in their material payoffs but also in the psychological 
payoffs which depend on the individuals’ kindness to others and their beliefs 
about the kindness of the other individual towards themselves. The resulting 
games are solved using the psychological games framework of 
Geanakoplos et al. (1989). 
While the action set ia describes the choices of player i (e.g. the access 
provided by M or the chosen payment of the customer), ijb defines the belief 
of i about the choices of player j whereas ijib is i ’s belief about what j
believes are i ’s choices. This framework of beliefs allows us to express the 
kindness and beliefs about the kindness of individuals towards another 
individual. This is achieved by comparing an actual payoff  to the 
equitable or fair payoff of a player, e . 
The equitable payoff of an individual is the average of his best and worst 
outcome based on the choices of the other individual.14 For agent j it is 
given by:
1
( ) (max{ ( )} min{ ( )})
2
e
j ij j i ij j i ijb a b a b       (5)
It can be seen as a reference point for how kind i is to j as this kindness 
ij is expressed by relating the actual payoff j is given by i to the equitable 
payoff of j :
( ) ( ) ( )eij i ij j i ij j ija b a b b      (6)
Similarly i ’s belief about the kindness of j to i is:
                                                
13 See Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for their theory of sequential reciprocity to solve 
games with belief-dependant motivations.
14 The average is used here because it is straightforward. Using another intermediate value is 
also possible and it does not affect the qualitative results. See also Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) footnote 7.
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Incorporating kindness and the beliefs about it gives the following utility 
function with a material payoff as the first term and the reciprocity payoff in 
the second term that is weighted by the sensitivity to reciprocity  ( 0  is 
the special case of pure self-interest).
)
~
,(~),(),( ijiijijiijiijiijiii bbbabaU   (8)
The condition to solve the game is that in equilibrium all beliefs and second 
order beliefs are correct. It is also important to mention that beliefs of players 
are updated over the course of the game. Once an action of a player has 
taken place, beliefs involving randomisation about this action are replaced 
by pure choice beliefs as the individuals apply Bayesian updating. 
A positive reciprocity equilibrium exists. The customer will make a voluntary 
payment, if her sensitivity to reciprocity is large enough: CC   . The 
possibility of CC   corresponds to the negative reciprocity equilibrium. 
After establishing conditions for C to make a voluntary payment once M has 
allowed full access, it has to be analysed whether M will ever provide full 
access in the first place. He knows that the customer will always pay the 
minimum when CC   and therefore he will never allow full access in that 
case. This constitutes the sequential reciprocity equilibrium of (limited 
access, (nasty, nasty)).
M also knows that C will act reciprocally once her sensitivity to reciprocity 
C is large enough. That means he assumes C will reward the choice of full 
access with a voluntary payment and will possibly reply to limited access 
with piracy. It can be shown that the condition for M to make the full access 
decision is always fulfilled and the sequential reciprocity equilibrium of (full 
access, (kind, nasty)) results.
Applying sequential reciprocity theory we can explain when customers make 
a voluntary payment. Social preferences are necessary which are
incorporated into the utility function with a reciprocity payoff. Once reciprocity 
gains (from returning kind behaviour) outweigh the material loss of making 
the higher payment ( vp instead of minp ), customers will prefer to make a 
voluntary payment. However, they have to be sufficiently motivated by 
reciprocity, e.g.   – their sensitivity to reciprocity – has to be large enough. 
Moreover, M has to believe that the aggregated  of the customer pool is 
large enough in order to provide full access in the first place.
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5.5.Further Discussion
The strategic setting of the “Magnatune” game has been presented in this 
section. An equilibrium solution based on social preferences and concerns 
for reciprocity has been developed which explains the voluntary payments in 
the analysed data.
The focus on reciprocity appears to be a good fit for the given context of an
online music store like Magnatune. However, reciprocity is just one possible 
theoretical approach and other motivations – or a combination of them –
may also explain the voluntary payments. Two other plausible motives (the 
“warm glow” from contributing to a good cause and guilt, the burden of 
paying less than one should) will also be outlined.
Trying to appeal to the morality of customers seems plausible in the highly 
charged field of online music. In fact, Magnatune also specifically addresses 
this on its web site. It promises “Internet music without the guilt”.
The emotion of guilt could therefore be induced by the fact that while albums 
can be had for only $5, the site recommends to pay $8. Customers are given 
the opportunity to pay something for the music in contrast to the 
downloading from P2P networks where no payments are possible. A latent 
guilty feeling from downloading might remain, whereas the Magnatune 
customers are provided with a mechanism to alleviate that – specifically 
reminded by the site.
Modeling emotions like guilt in detail will require an extended psychological 
analysis. However, a basic approach to take emotions into account would be 
a simple cost-benefit model (Elster 1998). Guilt could be seen as a psychic 
cost that is integrated into the utility function along with the material payoffs. 
A trade-off between the moral emotions and material self-interest is created 
comparable to a reciprocity payoff. When the psychic cost of guilt – e.g. the 
moral burden of paying less than one should – outweighs the material gain, 
the customer would decide to pay more to alleviate the guilt induced.
The customer’s choice depends on how sensitive to guilt she is. This can be 
expressed by the individual’s sensitivity to experience guilt . Paying only 
the minimum causes a psychic cost of guilt, which however may not affect 
the customer’s utility if she is “immune” against it. Customers with 
insignificant levels of  will likely not respond to the induced guilt. Instead, 
customers with a high sensitivity to guilt may chose to make a voluntary 
payment as this alleviates their guilt and maximizes their utility. The 
psychological games framework introduced in Section 5.4 can also be 
applied in the context of guilt, see Ruffle (1999) or Dufwenberg (2002).
The voluntary payments of Magnatune customers could also be seen as 
their private contributions to a public good. Customers might like the basic 
idea of the service (quality music for a reasonably low price, equal share
between artist and label, no DRM and comprehensive pre-purchase access) 
and might want to support Magnatune and the respective artist. Thus, they 
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contribute with a voluntary payment in order to support the label and as well 
the artist being active in the future which is of benefit for them.
While neoclassical theory predicts free riding and less than efficient 
payments of individuals in such a public good context,15 in practise 
contributions are higher than what purely selfish players would chose in 
these settings. Andreoni (1990) suggests that individuals not only derive the 
standard indirect benefit from their contributions (e.g. future consumption of 
the good), but also a direct benefit, a so-called “warm glow” from contributing 
to a good cause. Being proud of this act of kindness may be one inherent 
reason for the warm glow mechanism.
The direct benefit of a payment (or contribution) is weighted by the 
individual’s sensitivity to the warm glow mechanism  . Whether a customer 
then decides to contribute essentially depends on her sensitivity to 
experience warm glow. If a customer is not open at all to such emotions (e.g. 
if  =0), in deed no contribution beyond the minimum is rational. On the other 
hand, when a significant sensitivity to warm glow is present, a contribution, 
e.g. a voluntary payment, results.
Reciprocity, warm glow and guilt all explain voluntary payments in the open 
contracts design when a specific customer’s sensitivity (to reciprocity ( ), to 
the warm glow mechanism (  ), to experience guilt ( )) is large enough. 
Therefore, voluntary payments of one customer should not be randomly 
distributed, but rather be somewhat sticky, depending mostly on the 
sensitivity parameter of the customer. This is in line with the observed data 
as we were able to distinguish between different types of payment behaviour 
among frequent customers. If the voluntary payments are caused by a 
customer-specific underlying motivation, then transactions across customers 
should vary, while transactions from frequent customers should show 
consistent type-dependant patterns. Hence, knowing that the size of 
payments is quite specific to individuals can be seen as further evidence that 
the payments are motivated by social preferences instead of some 
unobservable factor or just due to complete randomness.
6. Conclusions
The observed pattern of behaviour – consumers do pay voluntarily – can be 
explained with a sufficiently high level of social preferences. The analysis of 
the strategic interaction between label/artists and customers shows that 
making a voluntary payment constitutes a sequential reciprocity equilibrium. 
The link to the theory focuses on reciprocity as the source of social 
preferences, because of the comprehensive and free pre-purchase access 
of Magnatune that allows customers to make an informed buying decision. 
                                                
15 When individuals only care about their consumption of private and public goods the resulting 
Nash equilibrium for the contribution level to the public good is less than what is socially optimal.
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This aspect appears to be of significant relevance in the context of 
information goods markets. Ample opportunities to sample yet unknown 
songs could well be regarded as kind behaviour by sufficiently socially-
minded customers thus triggering a kind reaction. A voluntary payment is 
made, while self-interested customers only pay the minimum. 
However, with the existing data set it is not possible to confirm that 
reciprocity is the main motivation for the observed voluntary payments. 
Other possible underlying motives for social preferences (“warm glow” 
(feeling good from contributing to a worthy cause) and guilt (the burden of 
paying less than one should)) are suggested that appear realistic in the 
analysed context of an online music store. It may well be that all of them are 
significant and more specific data is necessary to distinguish between the 
identified sources. Such an analysis remains for further research. 
Nevertheless, all three underlying motives – reciprocity, warm glow and guilt 
– explain the payment behaviour with socially-minded customers who 
maximise their utility. All three theories are based on a sensitivity parameter 
(to reciprocity, warm glow or to experience guilt) that is specific to 
individuals. This can be verified in the payment patterns of frequent 
customers where four distinct groups can be identified: customers who 
essentially always pay the minimum, the default, customers who pay 
significantly more than the average and the ones with a negative time trend.
Compared to a conventional online music store that charges a fixed price of 
– for instance – $8 an album (and offers only limited sampling possibilities if 
at all) Magnatune makes more visitors acquainted with its songs and thus 
turns more visitors of the site into customers; and on average they still pay 
more than the recommended price of $8. Of course, we could only speculate 
about the revenue, if a label charged a fixed price of more than $8. Our 
analysis cannot provide such a counterfactual, but a related study (Gneezy 
2009) finds that a loss from a name-your-own-price that is on average lower 
than the fixed price is offset by the higher volume. Finally, Magnatune is now 
at a break-even point according to the owner. 
Nevertheless, despite the success of Magnatune’s voluntary payments 
scheme it is important to stress that several conditions seem necessary to 
make the scheme work. Magnatune artists are rather unknown and the 
results cannot be easily applied to the mass market. The tendency of 
customers to make a voluntary payment should be seriously affected if the 
artist is a millionaire already. Hence, an open contracts design should be 
regarded as a promising alternative to strictly DRM-based online music 
stores. In a possible life-cycle of artists the market of Magnatune takes its 
position in an early stage where artists are not (yet) well-known.16 In this 
phase the experience good aspect of pre-purchase access is relatively more 
important in order to get exposure than for established artists. However, it 
may not necessarily be wealth and popularity of artists that limits the 
applicability of the scheme as Radiohead – a famous yet alternative rock 
                                                
16 See also Regner et al. (2009).
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band – offered their 7th album online for free and encouraged voluntary 
payments; apparently very successfully.17 Other conditions for a fruitful 
environment that encourages voluntary payments appear to be a fair sharing 
of revenue with the artists, a price range that takes the market price for CDs 
and downloads into account and a high degree of customer appreciation.
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